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Introduction 
 
Freudian psychoanalysis started as a therapeutic treatment meant 
to remove pathological symptoms. Moreover, it was Freud’s 
ambition to install a causal treatment, by which the symptoms 
would be removed in a permanent way. His initial enthusiasm 
about psychoanalysis as psychotherapy gave way to a more 
pessimistic view at the end of his career. Finally, he considered the 
analytic process to be “interminable”, thus turning psychoanalysis 
into an impossible profession. In the meantime, he had elaborated 
a whole new theory on psychopathology. 
Ever since Freud’s discovery of the unconscious, 
pathological processes are explained on the basis of defence, in 
which repression takes the prominent place. After Freud, it was 
more or less forgotten that repression in itself is already a second 
moment within the dynamics of the pathogenesis.  Indeed, 
repression is an elaboration of the defence process against the 
drive. Right from the beginning of his theory, Freud recognised a 
twofold structure within the symptom: on the one hand, the drive; 
on the other, the psyche. In Lacanian terms: the Real and the 
Symbolic. This is clearly present in Freud’s first case-study, that of 
Dora. In this study, Freud does not add to his theory of defence, 
which had already been elaborated in his two papers on the 
psychoneuroses of defence (Freud, 1894a, 1896b). It can be said 
that the core of this case-study resides precisely in this twofold 
structure, as he focuses on the real, drive-related element, what he 
denominates as the “Somatisches Entgegenkommen”.1 Later, in 
his Three Essays, this will be coined as the fixation of the 
pulsation.2 From this point of view, Dora’s conversion symptoms 
can be studied from two sides: a Symbolic one, i.e. the signifiers or 
psychical representations that are repressed; and a Real one, 
related to the drive, in this case the oral drive.  
Freud will confirm this hybrid composition of the symptom in 
all his later case- studies. Little Hans’ phobia is built upon and 
                                                            
1 S.Freud, 1905e, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, SE VII, pp. 40-41. 
2 S.Freud, 1905d, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, SE VII, passim. 
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against oral, anal and scopic drives; the obsessions of the Rat-
man go back to the scopic and the anal drive; and the same holds 
for the Wolf-man’s phobia and conversion symptoms (Freud, 
1909b, 1909d, 1918b). 
 
In the light of this twofold structure, every symptom has to be 
studied in a double way. For Lacan, both phobia and conversion 
symptoms come down to the formal envelope of the symptom, i.e. 
they are what gives Symbolic form to the Real of the drive.3 Thus 
considered, the symptom is a Symbolic construction built around a 
Real kernel of jouissance. In Freud’s words, it is “like the grain of 
sand around which an oyster forms its pearl.”4 The Real of the 
jouissance is the ground or the root of the symptom, whilst the 
Symbolic concerns the upper structure. 
Both Freud and Lacan discovered that it is precisely this root 
of the symptom in the Real that obstructs therapeutic 
effectiveness. They had to acknowledge the fact that the 
resistance of certain symptoms to interpretation and the relapse of 
symptoms after or during the analysis has everything to do with 
this drive root. We can demonstrate this by referring to the two 
Freudian case-studies for which there has been a kind of follow-
up. 
Six years after his analysis with Freud, the Wolf-man was 
seen by Ruth Mack Brunswick. She noted a change in character, 
which was analogous to the one during his early childhood.  “In 
this contemporary change of character, one finds the same 
regression to the anal sadistic and masochistic phase.”5  
Translated into Lacanian terminology, we can understand this 
regression as the “refente”, the splitting of the subject by the Real 
of anal jouissance. At least, this is what Brunswick’s next remark 
suggests: “I invite the reader here to refresh his memory by 
rereading Freud’s case study. All the infantile material is already 
there, nothing new was revealed during the analysis he did with 
me.”6 This remark endorses the idea that the character change is 
caused by the Real of the drive, and has nothing to do with any 
Symbolic material that might not have been analysed during the 
analysis with Freud. Indeed, the affirmation that her further 
analysis of the Wolf-man revealed no new material leads to the 
                                                            
3 J.Lacan, De nos antécédents, in: Ecrits, Seuil, Paris, 1966, p.66. 
4 S.Freud, 1905e, op. cit., SE VII, p.83. 
5 Ruth Mack Brunswick, 'A Supplement to Freud's History of an Infantile Neurosis' , in M. Gardiner, 
The Wolf-man by the Wolf-man, Basic Books, New York, 1971. 
6 Ibid., p. 270. Our Italics. 
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conclusion that the two analyses with Freud had exhausted all the 
Symbolic aspects of the symptom. The repressions had obviously 
been overcome, but the drive root, on the other hand, had not 
been rendered inactive. Moreover, it is clear that the analysis with 
Brunswick, and all the others that followed, did not succeed in this 
respect; at the age of 77, the Wolf man was still haunted by the 
anal drive. 
Concerning Dora, the same kind of reasoning can be 
applied. The postscript published by Felix Deutsch fifty years after 
Dora's analysis with Freud reveals that the original symptoms – the 
catarrh, the tussis nervosa and the aphonia – had returned in their 
original form.7 Obviously, the limited analysis that Freud undertook 
with her, was enough to remove the Symbolic material of her 
symptoms; but it did not touch on the relationship between the 
subject and the oral drive. Consequently, this oral drive reinserted 
itself into the chain of signifiers.8 
 
Thus, it is no surprise that Lacan considers the drive to be 
central to what he terms Freud’s will. Indeed, Freud’s conclusion 
after fifty years of clinical practice can be summarised as follows: it 
is the drive that determines the lasting success of the treatment.9 
The same evolution can be discovered in Lacan’s work: the early 
Lacan will focus on the Symbolic and the Imaginary, but from 
seminar XI (1964) onwards, the Real and the drive come to be 
given the most attention. 
 
 
 
Therapeutic effectiveness: insight or change? 
 
In the second period of Lacan's teaching, after 1964, he 
systematically demonstrated the twofold character of the symptom 
– Real and Symbolic – , thus continuing a central theme of Freud’s 
work.10 The reason for this is clear: traditionally, analysis tackles 
                                                            
7 F. Deutsch, 'A Footnote to Freud's Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria', in C.Bernheimer 
& C.Kahane (eds), In Dora's Case: Freud - Hysteria - Feminism, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1985, pp. 35-44. 
8 For a related discussion of the transition from letter to signifier, see below p.8. 
9 S.Freud, 1937c, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, SE XXIII, p.224 ff. 
J. Lacan, The Seminar. Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-1954, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. J. 
Forrester, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
10 The very same twofold structure can be found in every key Freudian concept. Each time, Freud 
makes a differentiation between a ‘primal’ form and a secondary version: primal repression – 'after-
repression', primal father – Oedipal father, primal phantasm – phantasm. In the context of our paper, 
the idea of primal repression is the most interesting one, because we can situate there the drive root of 
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the Symbolic component of the symptom, but it is the Real part 
that endangers the effectiveness of therapy. All the well-known 
problems – the partial resistance of certain symptoms against 
analytic treatment, the symptom-relapse after a certain period, the 
“negative therapeutic reaction” – can be understood as 
expressions of the Real, i.e. the drive component of the symptom. 
That is why the overcoming of the repression  - the Symbolic 
component of the symptom – does not lead automatically to the 
expected results. Lacan will summarise these problems with his 
theory of the object a, thus echoing Freud’s conclusion in Analysis 
Terminable and Interminable: “There are nearly always residual 
phenomena”.11 
We can draw up a balance sheet for the therapeutic results 
of psychoanalysis. Let us remember that Freud aimed at a causal 
treatment, rather than a superficial management of symptoms. It is 
clear that the overcoming of repression leads to insight and to the 
disappearance of symptoms. But even when the same or different 
symptoms stay away for months after the conclusion of an 
analysis, this clarification of the unconscious contents does not 
lead automatically to what we might consider to be a change in the 
subject. A “hysteria without symptoms”, or character-neurosis 
refers to a subject that is still determined by its drives. Even if the 
subject is freed from its symptoms, it can still function in a specific, 
repetitive manner. In Freudian terms, this reads as the repressions 
having been undone, but not the process of repression. For 
example, in his paper on Negation Freud stresses the relativity of 
the effects of overcoming repression: “In the course of analytic 
work we often produce a further, very important and somewhat 
strange variant of this situation. We succeed in conquering the 
negation as well, and in bringing about a full intellectual 
acceptance of the repressed; but the repressive process itself is 
not yet removed by this.”12 Ergo, even if the subject knows and 
accepts (“Bejahung”) the repressed contents, there is still a status 
quo on the level of subjective functioning. According to the Wolf-
man, Freud expressed this as follows: “Freud said that one could 
get cured by analysis, on condition that one wanted to be cured. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the symptom, i.e. the Real. It is only with the after-repression that the Symbolic component comes into 
being. For Freud, there is always a “faulty connection” (“falsche Verknüpfung”) between a drive 
component and a representation. One of us has elaborated this idea elsewhere: cf. P.Verhaeghe, Does 
the Woman Exist? From Freud’s Hysteric to Lacan’s Feminine,  New York – London: Other Press – 
Rebus, 1999, pp. 149-205. 
11 S.Freud, 1937c, op. cit., SE XXIII, p.228. 
12 S.Freud, 1925h, Negation, SE XIX, p.236. 
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He compared it to a railway ticket. The ticket gives me the 
possibility to travel, but does not oblige me to. The decision is 
mine.”13 With this metaphor, Freud makes it obvious that the 
change at the end of the treatment, or a general recovery, does 
not depend solely on the revelation or decoding of the 
unconscious, but far more so on a decision of the Ego. And this 
decision has everything to do with the drive. 
A psychoanalytic cure removes repressions and lays bare 
drive-fixations. These fixations can no longer be changed as such: 
the decisions of the body are irreversible.14 This is not the case for 
the positions of the subject towards the drive processes – these 
can be revised. There are two possibilities: either the subject now 
accepts a form of jouissance that he earlier refused; or he confirms 
this refusal.  
 
All repressions take place in early childhood; they are 
primitive defensive measures taken by the immature, feeble ego. 
In later years, no fresh repressions are carried out; but the old 
ones persist, and their services continue to be made use of by the 
ego for mastering the instincts. New conflicts are disposed of by 
what we call ‘after repression’. (...) Analyses, however, enables the 
ego, which has attained greater maturity and strength, to 
undertake a revision of these old repressions; a few are 
demolished [the drive is accepted by the subject], while others  
                                                            
13 Obholzer, op. cit., 1989, p. 77. Freud’s metaphor is all the more interesting when one knows about 
his train phobia… 
14 This irreversibility can be understood from a Freudian point of view concerning primal repression, 
which is first of all a primal fixation. In his descriptions of primal repression, Freud makes it clear that 
this primal fixation concerns the drive (see S.Freud, Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical 
Account of a case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides), 1911c, SE XII, pp. 66-67 and  Inhibitions, 
Symptoms and Anxiety, 1926d, SE XX, p.94. Freud’s idea of fixation is the precursor and the 
precondition of repression. Lacan made it clear that Freud’s fixation implies the idea of a choice-
making instance. For Lacan, this instance is the Real of the body , i.e. the Real of the drive. This Real 
of the bodily drive is independent of the subject: it is an instance that judges and chooses 
independently: “Ce qui pense, calcule et juge, c’est la jouissance” (“What thinks, computes and judges, 
is the Enjoyment”, J.Lacan, …Ou pire, Scilicet, 5, o.c., p.9). Subsequently, the subject has to take a 
position towards these choices of the body. If the subject does not accept a certain choice of the drive, 
this entails repression. From the aetiological point of view, repression is just a mechanism, which will 
be stressed by Lacan  when he states that  “l’inconscient travaille sans y penser, ni calculer, juger non 
plus.” (“the unconscious operates without thinking, computing or judging”, J.Lacan, Introduction à 
l’édition allemande d’un premier volume des Ecrits, Scilicet, 5, o.c., p.14.). It is in this context that one 
has to understand another Lacanian statement: that the subject is not condemned to his consciousness, 
but to his body (“Ce n’est pas à sa conscience que le sujet est condamné, mais à son corps”, J.Lacan, 
Réponses à des étudiants en philosophie sur l’objet de la psychanalyse, Cahiers pour l’analyse, 3, 
1966, p.8). For a more detailed elaboration of these ideas, see: F. Declerck, Het Reële bij Lacan, 
forthcoming. 
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are recognised but constructed afresh out of more solid 
material [the drive is refused in a more conclusive way]. 15  
 
This process entails a refusal that does not belong any more 
to the process of repression and symptom formation. “In a word, 
analysis replaces repression by condemnation”.16  
We must stress the fact that this decision of the subject 
concerns solely the drives in their pure form; in order to be able to 
take such a decision, the subject has to be connected in a direct 
way to the object a; which means that the analytic process has to 
have run its course and fulfilled its task of clarification. This implies 
that, firstly, the repressions have to be lifted, that is, the symptom 
has to be cleared of its Symbolic components. Thus, it is not 
possible to save oneself the trouble of an analysis and to go 
directly for the underlying cause, i.e. the drive root. Freud’s answer 
to this idea can be found in his response to Rank’s suggestion of 
directly tackling the primal trauma of birth: it would be of no more 
use than if the fire brigade contented themselves with removing 
the overturned lamp that set fire to the whole house – the building 
keeps burning.17  
Lacan’s theory of the relationship between the Real and the 
Symbolic presents us with a more consistent view. His metaphor of 
the jar is a better illustration of the reasons why one can’t save 
oneself the trouble of an analysis.18 According to Lacan, the 
essence of pottery making does not reside in the dressing of the 
sides of the jar, but in the emptiness, the hollow space which these 
sides precisely create. The jar elaborates and localises a hole in 
the Real – eventually, this elaboration and localisation amounts to 
an authentic creation. The resemblance to the genesis of 
psychopathological symptoms resides in the fact that it is only 
through the elaboration of the Symbolic constellation that the Real 
of the pulsation appears. In other words, one is obliged to pass 
through the Symbolic if one wants to approach the Real, because 
it is the Symbolic which delineates this Real. That is why 
psychoanalysis creates a new subject:19  
                                                            
15 S.Freud, 1937c, op. cit., p.227. 
16 S.Freud, 1909b, Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, SE X, p.145.  
17 S.Freud, 1937c, op. cit., pp. 216-217. 
18 Lacan, 1986, Le Séminaire, livre VII, L’ethique de la psychanalyse, Paris, Seuil, pp. 139-152. 
19 It’s important to see that Freud is talking about the ego, while we are talking about the subject. We’ll 
have to come back to this, especially because it entails an ontological problem. Besides that, in 
contemporary literature, the concept of  “subject” is used in a very careless way, almost synonymous 
with ‘person’ or ‘ego’. The specific Lacanian meaning of the term is different, and makes it very 
difficult to consider the subject as an instance that chooses or decides. According to Lacan’s pre-
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Is it not precisely the claim of our theory that analysis 
produces a state which never does arise spontaneously in the ego 
and that this newly created state constitutes the essential 
difference between a person who has been analysed and a person 
who has not?20 
 
Let us conclude our discussion of Freudian theory. With 
regard to the fixation of the drive (and thus the fixation of a 
jouissance), Freud evokes the free will of the patient. For instance, 
concerning moral masochism – jouissance in humiliation – Freud 
states: “(...) It must be honestly confessed that here we have 
another limitation to the effectiveness of analysis; after all, analysis 
does not set out to make pathological reactions impossible, but to 
give the patient’s ego freedom to decide one way or the other.”21 
He repeats the same idea when he discusses character neuroses 
(Lacan’s “hysteria without symptoms”):  
 
“[In character neurosis] it is not easy to foresee a natural 
end, even if one avoids any exaggerated expectations and sets the 
analysis no excessive tasks. Our aim will not be to rub off every 
peculiarity of human character for the sake of a schematic 
‘normality’, nor yet to demand that the person who has been 
‘thoroughly analysed’ shall feel no passions and develop no 
internal conflicts. The business of the analysis is to secure the best 
possible psychological conditions for the functions of the ego; with 
that it has discharged its task.”.22 
 
It is important to see that Freud does not consider it the task 
of psychoanalysis to intervene in the way the patient handles his 
drives. Its task is to provide the analysand with all the necessary 
information through which he will be able to assess his stance 
towards this drive-fixation and eventually change or keep that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ontology of seminar XI, the subject is not a decision-making instance, but an ever-failed realisation of 
one’s identity. If the treatment ends with a subject that can make decisions, then this has indeed to be a 
completely different kind of subject. This tallies with Lacan’s ideas in seminar XI on the effect of  “ se 
parer” in the process of separation, meaning: to dress oneself, to defend oneself, but also to give birth 
to oneself (J.Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, Seminar XI, ed. J.-A. Miller, 
trans. A.Sheridan, Hogarth Press 1977, p214; the original French version can be found at the end of 
chapter XVI of the seminar. See also: P.Verhaeghe, 'Causation and Destitution of a Pre-Ontological 
Non-Identity: On the Lacanian Subject', in D. Nobus (ed.), Key Concepts of Lacanian Psycho-Analysis, 
Rebus Press, 1998, pp. 164-1889. 
20 S.Freud, 1937c, op. cit., SE XXIII, p.227. 
21 S.Freud, 1923b, The Ego and the Id, SE XIX, p.50, n.1. 
22 S.Freud, op. cit., SE XXIII, p. 250. 
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stance. What Freud abhors most of all, and refuses in a 
categorical way, is the identification of the patient with the therapist 
as a “therapeutic solution” and end-point of the analysis.23  
 
 
Identification with the symptom 
 
In this respect, Lacan will present us with an identification of 
another kind, with which he specifies the decision-making process 
of the subject. Lacan coins the new subject, or the finally analysed 
subject, as the subject that has made a choice to identify with (the 
real kernel of) his symptom or object a:  
 
In what does this sounding that is an analysis consist? 
Would it, or would it not be to identify with the symptom, albeit with 
every guarantee of a kind of distance?”  “To know how to handle, 
to take care of, to manipulate (…) to know what to do with the 
symptom, that is the end of analysis.24 
 
Before we explore this formula, we have to stress the fact 
that Lacan not only elaborated this kind of decision-making 
process, but also radicalised it. Freud’s liberalism concerning the 
subject’s position towards the acceptance of a drive-fixation 
sometimes seems inspired by a sense of powerlessness, of failure 
to do any better. Several of his papers leave us with the 
impression that the acceptance of a fixation comes down to an 
ersatz for an unattainable ideal. Such an ideal would be the 
exhaustive genitalisation or phallicisation of the pregenital drives.25  
                                                            
23 Freud understood quite early that the “natural” end of a psychotherapy consisted in the identification 
of the patient with the therapist in the position of the Ego-Ideal, and refused this immediately for his 
psychoanalysis: “(…) but otherwise the outcome of one’s efforts is by no means certain. It depends 
principally on the intensity of the sense of guilt; (…). Perhaps it may depend, too, on whether the 
personality of the analyst allows of the patient’s putting him in the place of his ego ideal, and this 
involves a temptation for the analyst to play the part of prophet, saviour and redeemer to the patient. 
Since the rules of analysis are diametrically opposed to the physician’s making use of his personality in 
any such manner, it must be honestly confessed that here we have another limitation to the 
effectiveness of analysis; after all, analysis does not set out to make pathological reactions impossible, 
but to give the patient’s ego freedom to decide one way or the other.” (S.Freud, 1923b, op. cit., SE 
IXX, p.50, n.1). 
24 “En quoi consiste ce repérage qu’est l’analyse? Est-ce que ce serait, ou non, s’identifier, tout en 
prenant ses garanties d’une espèce de distance, à son symptôme?” “savoir faire avec, savoir le 
débrouiller, le manipuler (...) savoir y faire avec son symptôme, c’est là la fin de l’analyse.” J. Lacan, 
Le Séminaire XXIV, L'insu que sait de l'une bévue, s'aile a mourre, Ornicar ?,  12/13, 1977, pp. 6-7 
[our translation]. 
25 If Freud equates the subjective acceptance of a pregenital fixation with infantilism or perversion, he 
indirectly implies that a fixation is by definition abnormal, i.e. it does not tally with the genital norm. 
This can be read in his papers on the drive. In his Introductory Lecture 21 on “The Development of the 
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Thus, Balint’s idea of  “genital love” as the criterion for 
psychological health and normality, and hence as the end-point of 
the treatment, can very easily be endorsed by Freudian theory. 
By contrast, Lacan always took a clear stance against this 
idea of a supposedly normal genital-sexual life and the 
corresponding goal of analytic treatment.26 According to Lacan, the 
pre- and extra-genital objects constitute the essence of human 
sexuality, because the genital-sexual relationship does not exist. 
The sexual partner always takes the place of the fixated drive or 
object a:   
 
…this $ never deals with anything by way of a partner but 
object a inscribed on the other side of the bar. He is unable to 
attain his sexual partner, who is the other, except inasmuch as his 
partner is the cause of his desire. In this respect, as is indicated 
elsewhere in my graphs by the oriented conjunction of  $ and a, 
this is nothing other than fantasy.27 
  
The phallus is a kind of prosthesis, even an incomplete 
prosthesis. The residues Freud is talking about are, for Lacan, not 
accidental: the phallicization is structurally incomplete, the lack in 
the Other cannot be completely remedied. These ideas belong to 
the late Lacan; but they are already present in his fourth seminar 
(1956-1957), with its major thesis: the phallus is not an object, but 
an instance symbolising the drives. Indeed, Lacan will 
systematically repeat that the phallus is not the genital organ, but a 
signifier. Hence the phallus does not concern a drive such as the 
oral, anal, scopic or invocatory: “a genital drive, which no-one 
would be capable of defining as such.”28 The phallus is not an 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Libido”, he states clearly that with the genital phase, the drive has to submit itself to the genital. The 
very idea of development implies in itself the idea of a “normal” end-point. Freud’s formulation that 
the end-point of libidinal development comes down to the “subordination” (sic.) of all sexual partial 
drives to genital primacy and thus to the “subjection” (sic.) of sexuality to reproduction, leaves little 
doubt about the fact that he considers genital sexuality to be the optimal and final point. (S.Freud, SE. 
XVI, p. 328) In his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, “Character and Anal Eroticism”, “The 
Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis” and “On the Transformation of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal 
Erotism”, the same message can be found: once one has passed through the genital stage, pregenital 
drives are outdated. All libidinal investments of the anal and oral zone, of looking and hearing, have to 
serve the function of genital sexuality. 
26 “Freud never succeeded in conceiving the said sexuality otherwise than as perverse. (…) perversion 
is the essence of man”  (“Freud n’a jamais réussi à concevoir ladite sexualité autrement que perverse. 
(...) la perversion est l’essence de l’homme.” J. Lacan, Le Séminaire XXIII, Le Sinthome, Ornicar ?, 
11, 1977, p. 8. 
27 Lacan, 1998, Seminar XX, Encore: On Feminine Sexuality. The limits of love and knowledge, 1972-
73, translated with notes by B.Fink, Norton, NY-London, p.80. 
28 J.Lacan, 1966-67, 17-01-67: “(…) pulsion génitale que quiconque serait bien incapable de définir 
comme telle”. 
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object, but an instance that regulates the jouissance coming from 
other sources, i.e. the objects a. Their jouissance is regulated 
through being interpreted by the phallic signifier, and thus turned 
into phallic pleasure. Structurally, this symbolisation remains 
incomplete. The object a is that part of the Real that resists 
symbolisation.29 
Fixations, which Freud considered to be primal symptoms, 
are of a general nature, in Lacan's view. The symptom is what 
defines mankind, and as such it cannot be rectified or cured. This 
is Lacan’s final conclusion: there is no subject without a symptom. 
30 In his last conceptualisations, the concept of symptom receives 
a new meaning. It is a question of a purified symptom, i.e. one 
stripped of its symbolic components; of what ex-sists outside the 
unconscious structured as a language: object a or the drive in its 
pure form.31 The Real of the symptom or object a demonstrates 
the particular jouissance of the Real body of this particular subject: 
“I define the symptom as the way everyone enjoys the 
unconscious insofar as they are determined by the unconscious.”32 
Lacan prefers the idea of symptom to that of object a, in 
accordance with his thesis that there is no sexual relationship. If 
there is no normal sexual relationship as such, every relationship 
between sexual partners is a symptomatic one. 
 
 
Believing in one’s symptom 
 
The significance of this formula – identification with the symptom – 
is to be understood through comparison with its opposite: to 
believe in one’s symptom. Both formulas – identification with and 
belief in – fit within a certain conceptual logic of Lacan’s teaching. 
This logic can be reconstructed as follows. In his seminar 
R.S.I.(1974-1975), Lacan designates the Real part of the symptom 
or object a through the concept of the “Letter”.33 The letter is the 
drive-related kernel of the signifier, the substance fixating the Real 
jouissance. The signifier, by contrast, is a letter that has acquired a 
                                                            
29 This idea of the Real as an internal exteriority, a central lack, was elaborated by Lacan in his seminar 
VII with his topology of Das Ding. The Real is  “au centre dans le sens qu’il est exclu” (Lacan, 1986, 
p.87). 
30 This is already clear with Freud, especially in the paper that Lacan considers to be Freud’s will: 
Analysis terminable and interminable. 
31 Lacan, 1974-75, R.S.I., Ornicar ?, 3, 1975, pp. 106-107. 
32 Ibid., lesson of 18 – 02 - 75,: “Je définis le symptôme par la façon dont chacun jouit de l’inconscient 
en tant que l’inconscient le détermine”. 
33  Ibid., 1974-75, lesson of 21-01-75. 
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linguistic value. In the case of the signifier, the Real of the drive is 
already absorbed by the Symbolic, it is semiotized. Within this 
reasoning, Lacan identifies the ‘letter’ or object a with the master 
signifier, S1 – on condition that this S1 is understood as 
disconnected from S2, the battery of other signifiers. The “letter” 
S1 is only turned into a signifier when connected to S2.34  
With this idea of the letter, Lacan wants to highlight the fact 
that the border between the Real and the Symbolic is a weak one: 
it is always possible for the Real to be colonised by the Symbolic. 
The chain of signifiers absorbs, for example, Dora’s oral 
jouissance: the Real of the drive has been semiotized through the 
symptoms of tussis nervosa and hoarseness. All of the symptoms 
analysed by Freud, i.e. the Symbolic, representational part of 
them, returned later almost unchanged.35  
It is within this field of tension between letter and signifier 
that Lacan situates the decision of the subject. A subject can 
choose either an identification with or a belief in his symptom. As a 
matter of fact, this choice concerns two radically different forms of 
identification. 
To believe in one's symptom (or ‘letter’) consists in adding 
three dots (…) to the letter: S1… To believe in the symptom is to 
believe in the existence of a final signifier, S2, to reveal the 
ultimate signification and sense of the S1. The condition for this is 
the existence of a guarantee that the Other has no lack. Hence, 
such a belief in the symptom implies a belief in the Other. It is not 
difficult to see that such a belief in the symptom or the S2 amounts 
to a belief in the existence of a sexual relationship:  
 
The three dots of the symptom are as a matter of fact, if I can 
put it this way, question marks within the non-rapport. This justifies 
the definition that I gave you already: that what constitutes the 
symptom, what sucks the unconscious, is that one believes in it.36 
 
                                                            
34 There is a beautiful Freudian example of this process: the famous “Glanz auf der Nase”/glance at the 
nose of the Wolf-man, where it is the translation that takes care of the transition from letter to signifier. 
In the original German version of the symptom, the kernel of the drive is central; while in the defensive 
translation, the process of 'significantisation' takes place. Cf. S.Freud, 1927e, Fetishism, SEXXI, 
pp.152-53. 
35 See F.Deutsch, op. cit. 
36 “Les points de suspension du symptome sont en fait des points, si je puis dire, interrogatifs dans le 
non-rapport. C’est ce qui justifie cette définition que je vous donne, que ce qui constitue le symptôme, 
ce quelque chose qui se bécotte avec l’inconscient, c’est qu’on y croit”. (Lacan, R.S.I., Ornicar ? , 3,  
1975, p. 109). 
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This belief in the symptom or the letter is typical of the 
beginning of an analysis, not its final phase. The patient comes to 
the analyst because he is convinced – and rightly so – that his 
symptom has a meaning. Thereby the analyst is put in the position 
of the one who knows, the one who will reveal this hidden 
signification, the Other without any lack. To put it differently: the 
patient lets his symptom be followed by (…), hoping that these will 
receive a meaning during the analysis, based on the 
interpretations of the analyst. This is the element of insight and 
clarification within analysis. It works only up to a certain point, the 
point when the signifying chain S2 is used up; this is the point of 
the inconsistency of the Other. At this crossroads between S2 and 
the lack in the Other, the analysand has two possible choices: 
either he chooses a new solution and identifies with the Real of the 
symptom; or he sticks to the previous solution and looks for yet 
another meaning by way of another hysterical identification: $  à 
S1 à S2. 
The formula “identification” applies to both subjective 
positions, because both entail a different identity. With the belief in 
the symptom, the subject connects itself to the signifying chain S1 
à S2, which Lacan considers “a whole-hearted preference for the 
unconscious”.37 This Symbolic identity is accompanied by a lack of 
being (“manque-à-être”). It can barely be considered an identity, 
because it shifts continuously through the chain of signifiers – 
hence the typical hysterical question: “Who am I?” On the other 
hand, through identification with the letter, fixating the jouissance, 
the subject acquires a Real identity, connecting it to the Real of its 
being. This is the identity which defines the subject – i.e. his 
particular, privileged way of enjoying. “Well, similarly, the 
reciprocity between the subject and object a is total.”38 
We have to stress the fact that this identification with the 
symptom does not come down to surrendering. On the contrary, to 
surrender is an expression of impotence and thus characterises 
the attitude of belief in the symptom. The personal failure is 
considered to be isolated and individual, while the conviction still 
exists that other people, the Other, succeed in realising The 
Relationship. This is not the case for a subject who has identified 
with his symptom and who has verified – during his analysis – that 
the failure of the sexual relationship is not a matter of individual 
impotence, but of a structural impossibility. The analysis has made 
                                                            
37 “Une préférence donnée en tout à l’inconscient”, Lacan, Ornicar ? , 12/13, 1977, p. 15. 
38 “La réciprocité entre le sujet et l’objet a est totale”, Lacan, 1998, seminar XX, op. cit. , p.127.  
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clear that the essence of the subject – “son être du sujet” – is 
situated at the place of the lack of the Other, the place where the 
Other does not provide us with an answer. The analysand has 
experienced the fact that the subject is “an answer of the Real” 
and not  “an answer of the Other”.39  
This change implies a change in the subject's position vis a 
vis jouissance. Before, the subject situated all jouissance on the 
side of the Other and took a stance against this (a position that 
was particular to this particular subject, i.e. its fundamental 
phantasm); after this change, the subject situates jouissance in the 
body, in the Real body.40 Hence, there is no longer a jouissance 
prescribed by the Other, but a jouissance entailed in the particular 
drives of the subject. Lacan coins the Sinthome to designate the 
idiosyncratic jouissance of a particular subject.41 The identification 
with the symptom is in this respect not a Symbolic nor an 
Imaginary one, but a Real identification, functioning as a 
suppletion (suppléance) for the lack of the Other. 
On the other hand, the subject who believes in his symptom, 
believes in a sacred prescription of the Other… that will never 
arrive. Meanwhile, this subject has to fall back on suppletions for 
this non-existent Other; the most commonly practised suppletion 
being the institution of marriage, regulating the relations between 
the two genders in conformity with contemporary law and religion. 
Which, of course, does not prevent such a believing subject from 
complaining about these suppletions. The belief in the symptom is 
the Symbolic suppletion for the lack of the Other. 
 
 
A new subject as a result of the treatment? 
 
Lacan’s final theory of the end of the cure is not without its internal 
difficulties; the two main ones concern the status of the subject 
and the significance of the function of the father. 
                                                            
39 “La raison en est que ce que le discours analytique concerne, c’est le sujet, qui, comme effet de 
signification, est réponse du réel” (The reason for this is that, concerning the analytic discourse, it is the 
subject that, as an effect of signification, is an answer of the Real”, Lacan, L'étourdit, Scilicet 4, 1973, 
p.15). 
40 “Body” not in the sense of the Symbolic or Imaginary body, but the body as organism, as Real. See 
P.Verhaeghe, The Subject of the Body, paper given at the UCLA-conference, March 1999 (to be 
published). 
41 "Sinthome" is an equivocal neologism, combining at least three different signifiers: symptôme 
(symptom), saint homme (holy man), Saint Thomas (the one who didn't belief the Other - Christ - but 
went for the Real Thing). 
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The notion of the “subject” has a long history in Lacan’s 
theory, which can be understood as his attempt to take his 
distance from ego-psychology in general and from the autonomous 
ego in particular. The Lacanian subject lacks all substance, and 
comes down to a border process of opening and closing that never 
reaches any final stage. The underlying “being” is always lost, at 
the very moment it is supposed to appear in the signifiers of the 
Other. That is why it is condemned to a structurally determined 
form of never-being-there. Hence the paradoxical fact that the 
essence of the Lacanian subject comes down to its lacking any 
kind of essence whatever, and that the whole accent has to be put 
on its divided character.42 
Nevertheless, with this final theory, Lacan introduces another 
subject, one that has, after all, a kind of substantiality. It is 
tempting to consider this, in the light of what we inherit from the 
Sixties, as a Lacanian version of the “authentic true self”.  Beyond 
the ever-present fascination of such a temptation, it is interesting 
to note what differentiates the Lacanian neo-subject: it is not an 
authentic subject, on the contrary; it no longer focuses on the (lack 
of the) Other, i.e. the Symbolic and the Imaginary. Rather, this 
neo-subject tries to come and go with the Real of the jouissance 
dictated by its own drive, without falling back into the previous trap 
of stuffing it full of signification. This is how the decision, the choice 
of the subject is to be understood. If there is anything original or 
authentically present, it has to be looked for in the Real of the body 
and the drive.  
As a consequence, there is no such a thing as a ‘liberation’ 
of the subject from the desire of the alienating Other, setting free 
‘the original, authentic subject’. On the contrary, there has never 
been an authentic subject, so there can be no return to it. This 
neo-subject is a creation of the analytic process: it becomes a 
possibility once the analysand has reached the point where the 
interpretations have revealed the final non-sense of his 
symptoms.43 The condition for this is that both the analyst and the 
analysand ‘fall’ from their belief in the Other. It is this process that 
Lacan constantly tries to grasp from seminar XI onwards, with 
expressions such as ‘separation’, the ‘traversal’ of the phantasm, 
                                                            
 
43 J.Lacan, 1994, seminar XI, op. cit., p.250. 
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or ‘subjective destitution’.44 As a creation, it is indeed a creation ex 
nihilo, i.e. one not based on any previous identity, which in one 
way or another would be tributary to the Other. Hence the implicit, 
but very important, meaning of separation in seminar XI: se parer: 
to give birth to oneself.45  
The trouble is that such a decision or choice by the subject 
implies the existence of a decision-making instance, independent 
of the Other. This hardly tallies with the constitutive process of 
becoming a subject, i.e. the alienation, which makes the subject 
dependent on the Other – hence the necessity of the ideas of 
separation and destitution. Beyond this, the instance acquires 
substantiality through its decision. After all, we are talking about 
identification with the Real of the symptom. In this context, Freud 
always refers to the ego, and with the post-Freudians this 
becomes the autonomous ego. It is quite clear that Lacan is close 
to a revised version of this autonomous ego… 
 
The second problem is interwoven with the first: it concerns 
the role of the father in the becoming of the subject. With the early 
Lacan, the whole emphasis was put on the metaphor of the Name 
of the Father, whose function was to free the subject from the 
desire of the mother, etc. The continuing popularity of this 
theoretical motif within contemporary Lacanian thinking contrasts 
sharply with the fact that Lacan not only abandoned it, but even 
replaced it with an opposing idea: that there is no Other of the 
Other. The belief in the father is a typically neurotic symptom, a 
fourth ring within the Borromean structure. Lacan takes his leave 
from it, and starts looking for a new signifier to fulfil the required 
function, i.e. to bind together the three rings.  
In this context, it is important to differentiate between the 
father and his function. The function relates to the separation of 
mother and child, entailing the liberation of the latter from the 
jouissance of the Other. If this separation ends up as an alienation, 
with the father as a second Other, then there is structurally no 
difference between it and the previous alienation. It was Lacan’s 
intention to get beyond this point, and that is why he focused on 
the function – i.e. separation – and its Symbolic character, 
meaning that the operative factor is a signifier. In Freud’s time, this 
signifier was linked to the real father, but this is a mere historical 
                                                            
44 It is quite remarkable that not one of these three notions was fully elaborated by Lacan himself. The 
last one – “destitution subjective” – (J.Lacan,1 1Proposition d’Octobre, Scilicet, 1, 1968,  p23) is today 
the most well-known, but this is mainly due to Slavoj .Zizek’s extensive commentaries on it. 
45 J.Lacan, 1994, op. cit., seminar XI, p.214. 
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contingency. The very same function can be installed through a 
totem name giving within a clan structure. There, separation is also 
attained through name-giving; and likewise there a first, externally-
determined identity – member of the mother group – is also 
replaced by a second, externally-determined identity – member of 
the brother and uncle group. In both cases, the process of name-
giving is the central one, and it is precisely this process which 
Lacan privileges in his later theory.46 Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that in both cases the subject still has to believe in this 
name-giving and what it stands for – and these are determined by 
the Other. 
In other words, Lacan does not escape the very same 
problem which Freud already had to cope with, and even in the 
same context: the separation function of the signifier is only 
operative on condition that one believes in it. Hence the whole 
thing remains in the realm of the Imaginary, and one has to fall 
back on the “Credo quia absurdum”. Freud quoted this expression 
of Tertullian's precisely in questioning the whys and wherefores of 
paternal authority, thus expressing its arbitrary character.47  
This deadlock is all the more important because a Lacanian 
analysis precisely demands of the analyst that he take his leave 
from the position of the father.  
 
 
The belief of the analyst 
 
So far, we can summarise our findings as follows. Both Freud and 
Lacan agree that the success of an analysis depends on a 
decision - that of the ego (Freud) or of the subject (Lacan). Lacan 
tried to elaborate this decision-making process. The identification 
with the symptom promises a positive prognosis, i.e. a sufficient 
neutralisation of the pathogenesis. This identification implies that 
the subject has reached a certain conclusion through his analysis, 
i.e. that the pathological process is ultimately an effect of the 
general trauma of the non-existence of a sexual rapport, and that 
its signification always comes down to an alienation in the 
                                                            
46 Ref nog opzoeken via E.Porge boek, is voor Paul. 
47 S.Freud, 1939a, Moses and Monotheism, SE XXIII, p.118.  
In a fascinating essay, John Brenkman discusses the difficulties in education, when one wants to raise 
his children without religion. The main difficulties do not reside in the dichotomy between reason and 
faith, but in the question of which narratives, symbols and discourses to use if one does not believe. 
(J.Brenkman, The Labyrinth of Accusation, in Venue, 3, 1998, pp.144-156). 
Psychoanalytische Perspectieven, 2016, 34, 4 
 
 
 
signifiers of the Other.48  Based on this conclusion, the subject 
chooses a certain modality of jouissance and takes his leave of the 
three dots that used to follow his symptom. With this conclusion, 
the analysand testifies to a kind of positive not-wanting-to-know, 
through which he detaches himself from the linguistically 
structured unconscious. 
Of course, it is possible that the analyst himself has never 
reached this conclusion, and that he still believes in the ultimate 
S2… in which case he continues to push the analysand's “letter” 
back into the chain of signifiers with his interpretations. This turns 
the analysis into an interminable process; indeed, one can always 
find yet another S2 to add to the S1. In this way, psychoanalysis is 
turned into a fraud (“escroquerie”).49 The belief of the analyst in the 
existence of a sexual relationship and the guaranteeing father 
does not make it easier for the analysand. In this respect, Colette 
Soler has criticised Freud for the position he took in his analytic 
practice. One of her pertinent remarks is that Freud’s interpretation 
of the deadlocks of castration and penis-envy in terms of 
transference resistances, says a lot about his own position in these 
matters.50 It is Soler's thesis that the structural deadlock does not 
consist of castration and penis-envy, but of Freud’s relationship to 
both of these. On several occasions, Lacan commented on Freud 
taking this father position during his analytic practice: “We know 
that we cannot operate anymore in our position of analyst as Freud 
did, who took in analysis the position of the father. (...) And that is 
why that we don't know any more where to go to – because we 
have not learned to re-articulate which position should be ours 
starting from there.”51 
Privately, Freud admitted that he took the position of the 
father during the transference, and he even added that this made 
him a bad analyst.52 At the end of the day, Freud placed the father 
in the place of the lack of the Other: “The lack referred to here is 
indeed that which I have already formulated: that there is no Other 
of the Other. But is this mark made by the Unbeliever of the truth 
                                                            
48 See P.Verhaeghe, Trauma and Hysteria in Freud and Lacan, in: The Letter, Lacanian Perspectives on 
Psychoanalysis, Autumn 1998, nr.14, pp. 87-106. 
49 J. Lacan, Ornicar ?, 17/18, 1979, p. 7. 
50 Freud, 1937c, o.c., S.E. XXIII, p.252. C. Soler, Aimer son symptôme, La Cause Freudienne, Revue 
de Psychanalyse, La passe: fait ou fiction ?, 1994, pp. 103-114. 
51 “Nous savons bien que nous ne pouvons pas non plus opérer dans notre position d’analyste comme 
opérait Freud, qui prenait dans l’analyse la position du père. (..) Et c’est pour cela que nous ne savons 
plus où nous fourrer — parce que nous n’avons pas appris à réarticuler à partir de là quelle doit être 
notre position à nous.” J. Lacan, Le Séminaire, Livre VIII, Le Transfert, Texte établi par J.-A. Miller, 
Paris, du Seuil, 1991, p. 345 
52 Kardiner, 1978, p.103. 
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really the last word that is worth giving in reply to the question, 
‘What does the Other want of me?’ when we, the analysts, are its 
mouthpiece? Surely not, and precisely because there is nothing 
doctrinal about our office. We are answerable to no ultimate truth; 
we are neither for nor against any particular religion. It is already 
quite enough that at this point I had to situate the dead Father in 
the Freudian myth.””53 
If the analyst believes in the existence of the sexual 
relationship, it is understandable that his analysands – and 
especially the ones who have to take the position of the spiritual 
son – demand an account of this. And on this point, the “father” of 
psychoanalysis reveals himself to be impotent as well. The 
discussion between Freud and Ferenczi is paradigmatic in this 
respect. 
Again, we meet here with the difficulty we discussed above. 
The function of separation that liberates the subject from the first 
alienation with the first Other, is indispensable, but introduces 
inevitably a new alienation, this time with the liberator, in casu the 
father, who thereby receives the status of symptom. The proper 
cause of desire and jouissance – the object a – is left aside. In 
other words, the function of the father is the regulating factor, but 
not the Real cause of desire. The Real is the root of the drive; the 
function of the father stands for the Symbolic shaping of the 
symptom. Therefore psychoanalysis should not be turned into the 
ritual of the father: “(…) and psychoanalysis is not the rite of the 
Oedipus complex.”54 On the contrary, it should create the 
possibility for the subject to get to the heart of the matter, i.e. the 
object a. Its precondition is the insight that the function of the 
father is a Symbolic suppletion. 
 
 
Creatio ex nihilo: le sinthome 
 
The identification of the subject with the object a not only replaces 
this Symbolic suppletion with a more stable, Real one, but has in 
addition creative effects: the jouissance of one's own drives 
creates the ‘Other gender’. To be sure, this Other is a fiction, but it 
is a fiction that does not turn the subject into a dupe, because he 
has created it by himself, based on his particular way of 
jouissance. Lacan calls this self-created fiction a sinthome: a 
                                                            
53 Lacan, 1966, p. 818, our italics. “J.Lacan, Ecrits: a selection, translated by A.Sheridan, 1977, p.316. 
54 Lacan, Ecrits, a selection, o.c., p.316. 
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particular signifier that knots the three registers of the Real, the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary into a particular sexual rapport.  
 
That which I have defined for the first time as a sinthome, is 
what permits the Symbolic, the Real and the Imaginary to be kept 
together (…) On the level of the sinthome, there is a relationship. 
(…) There is only a relationship where there is a sinthome.55  
 
The condition for such a creation is that the subject has 
become free of the Other, of the language of the Other. “In any 
case, what I am saying is that the invention of a signifier is 
something different from memory. It is not that the child invents – 
he receives the signifier, and it is even this that makes it 
worthwhile to do it more. Our signifiers are always received. Why 
shouldn’t we invent a new signifier? For instance, a signifier that 
would have no sense at all, just like the Real?”.56  
At the end of the Encore seminar, Lacan had already evoked 
this idea –the creation of a new signifier –, in talking about poetry. 
A new knowledge can be created only at the place of the lack of 
the Other. As long as one stays under the umbrella of the Other, 
there is no new knowledge possible. In this sense, it is no 
coincidence that Lacan’s continuation and crossing of Freud’s 
theory coincides with his expulsion from the IPA.57  
                                                            
55 . J. Lacan, Le Séminaire XXIII, Le Sinthome, Ornicar ?, 8, 1976, p. 20.  “Ce que pour la première 
fois j'ai défini comme un sinthome, est ce qui permet au symbolique, à l'imaginaire et au réel, de tenir 
ensemble (…). "Au niveau du sinthome, (…) il y a rapport. (…) Il n'y a rapport que là où il y a 
sinthome.” 
56 J. Lacan, Le Séminaire XXIV, L'insu que sait de l'une bévue, s'aile a mourre, Ornicar ?,  17/18, 1979, 
p. 21.? “Ce que j’énonce en tout cas, c’est que l’invention d’un signifiant est quelque chose de différent 
de la mémoire. Ce n’est pas que l’enfant invente — ce signifiant, il le reçoit, et c’est même ça qui 
vaudrait qu’on en fasse plus. Nos signifiants sont toujours reçus. Pourquoi est-ce qu’on n’inventerait 
pas un signifiant nouveau? un signifiant par exemple qui n’aurait, comme le réel, aucune espèce de 
sens?” This quote sums up the first difficulty we discussed above: how to become independent from 
the (signifiers of the) Other. 
57 It is no coincidence either that his removal from the IPA coincides with the seminar on the Names of 
the father. Neither is it a coincidence that he gave only one lesson. The lack of this seminar provides us 
with a perfect mirror-image of the lack of the Other of the Other. In this context, the subsequent course 
of Lacan’s institutional history is very revealing as well. In spite of his efforts to take up the position of 
the object a, both in his School and during his analytic practice, Lacan underwent the same fate as 
Freud. His concepts did not provide the impetus for a new knowledge, but became embalmed as well. 
Finally, to escape from the position of founding father, and to open the possibility for inventing a new 
knowledge, Lacan dissolved his School and took up the position of object a: he interrupts the seminar 
and stays at bay during the founding of the ECF in 1980; see also J. Lacan, Lettre de Dissolution, , 
Ornicar ? , 20/21: “This problem demonstrates that, in order to have a solution, one has the dis-
solution. (…) It is enough that one goes in order to liberate all the others, and that goes for every one in 
my borromean knot; in my school, it has to be me.” “Ce problème se démontre tel, d’avoir une 
solution: c’est la dis — la dissolution (...) Qu’il suffise d’un qui s’en aille pour que tous soient libres, 
c’est, dans mon noeud borroméen, vrai de chacun, il faut que ce soit moi dans mon École.” (Lacan, 
1980, p. 9). 
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In the context of the creation of a new signifier or sinthome, 
creation is only creation insofar as it builds upon the lack of the 
Other, that is: insofar as it is a creatio ex nihilo: “It is by this {the 
lack} that I try to meet the function of art, what is implied by what is 
left blank as fourth term, when I say that art can even reach the 
symptom.”58 
This is the lesson learnt by Lacan from Joyce’s “savoir faire”. 
Joyce’s sinthome comes down to his literary productions, which 
are built on the lack of the Other - which for Lacan is hardly 
surprising, because he allots Joyce a psychotic structure. And 
based on these creations, based on this sinthome, he knots the 
three registers of the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic into a 
particular “sexual rapport”:  “I have said of Joyce that he is the 
symptom. His entire work testifies to it. Exiles touches his central 
symptom, the symptom made of the lacking as such of the sexual 
rapport”.59 
What is there to be deduced from this concerning neurosis, 
especially concerning the conclusion of a psychoanalytic cure? We 
have already stated that normally, i.e. neurotically, the signifier of 
the Name of the Father is expected to take the place of the lack in 
the Other and to knot the registers of the Real, the Symbolic and 
the Imaginary in such a way that the jouissance is forbidden.60 The 
seminar on Joyce demonstrates that it is possible for a sinthome to 
take the role of the signifier of the Name of the Father. Lacan 
invites everyone to follow Joyce’s example and to create their own 
sinthome at the place of the lack of the Other; the aim of this 
creative act is to be able to function without the signifier of the 
Name of the Father, i.e., the Other.  
Lacan specifies that this new signifier, just like the Real, has 
no sense (“le sens”), which implies that it cannot be exchanged 
with other subjects. Not only would it not ‘fit’ another subject, 
worse still - this new signifier cannot be formalised. It belongs to 
the field of the orthodox: it is a particular way of handling a 
particular jouissance. In our reading, this explains why Lacan in his 
last seminars repeatedly returns to the idea of creation and the act. 
In this, the accent is not so much on the result of the creation as 
on the fact that creation is highly individual, particular. 
 
                                                            
58 J.Lacan, Le Séminaire XXIII, Le Sinthome, Ornicar ?, 6, 1976, p. 18. 
59 J. Lacan, Le Séminaire XXIII, Le Sinthome, Ornicar ?, 7, 1976, p. 15. 
60 J.Lacan, Le Séminaire XXIV, L'insu que sait de l'une bévue, s'aile a mourre, Ornicar ?,  12/13, 1977, 
pp. 6-7. 
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To conclude on the creative effect of identifying with the 
symptom, we have to return to the specific character of this 
identification. We have already said that this identification belongs 
to a specific context. The idea of  “identification with the real of the 
drives” may not be taken literally, because the Real of the drives 
remains heterogeneous to the subject, the object a maintaining its 
traumatic character. Lacan emphatically recommends taking a 
distance from the symptom: “(…) to identify, whilst assuring 
oneself of a kind of distance towards one’s symptom.”61 This is the 
function of the new signifier: it creates a band around the lack in 
the Symbolic, although this band is completely different from the 
phobic one. The castration phobia marks out the Real as 
impenetrable, while the new signifier – the sinthome – on the 
contrary provides a connection to the jouissance, creating a 
particular sexual relationship: “On the level of the sinthome, (…) 
there is a rapport. (…) there is only a rapport where there is a 
sinthome.”62 
Last but not least, this theory permits a completely new 
approach to the question of gender. The Woman does not exist in 
the Symbolic, The Man exists far too much there. Just like a man, 
a woman has to alienate herself in the ever-phallic signifiers of the 
Other. The man, due to his relationship to the phallic signifier and 
the S1, is taken “naturally” in the direction of identification with the 
signifier, i.e. he sticks to alienation. Woman knows this alienating 
relationship as well, but at the same time, she entertains a special 
relationship to the object a and jouissance.  Due to this double 
relationship, a woman is “naturally” invited to create something of 
herself, in the very process of becoming a woman. 
 
In this sense, the Lacanian conclusion of the treatment – the 
identification with the Real of the symptom, the choice of 
jouissance and the creation of a neo-subject – is a particular 
process that is situated entirely in the line of femininity.  
                                                            
61ibid 
62 J. Lacan, o.c. 
